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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

Texas law provides that a person whose property is injured by an
overflow of water caused by an unlawful diversion or impounding has
remedies at law and in equity and may recover damages occasioned by
the overflow. Texas law also provides that government units are
generally immune from tort liability except where the legislature has
specifically waived that immunity. In order to prevail against a
government entity, an action must fit into one of the exceptions
provided or it fails as a matter of law.
The Texas Court of Appeals held that because the Residents did
not meet an exception to the defense of sovereign immunity, the
Drainage District was immune from liability as a matter of law.
MichaelBarry

Raburn v. KJI Bluechip Inv., 50 S.W.3d 699 (Tex. App. 2001)
(affirming summary judgment due to inability to establish a duty of
reasonable care in the event of a flash flood that renders a highway
impassible).
While traveling Texas Highway 114, a flash flood swept John and
Janet Raburn's ("Raburns") vehicle off of the highway. At the moment
the vehicle was washed off of the road, it was on a stretch of highway
running through land owned by KJI and leased to Ed and Tom Strader
("Straders").
The Raburns' vehicle quickly became submerged.
Rescuers successfully freed Janet and one of her sons. Janet's other
son, Justin, was swept away in the current, and was later found dead.
In an action for personal injuries and wrongful death, the Raburns
alleged that as owners of the abutting property, KJI and the Straders
had a duty to put into place a system that would safely facilitate the
flow and drainage of water. KJI and the Straders moved for summary
judgment. They alleged the state of Texas had an exclusive, nondelegable duty to control storm and flood waters, and therefore they
were immune from the Raburn's negligence claim. The trial court
granted these motions and the Raburns appealed.
The applicable legal standard is such that if at least one element of
the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established, the defendant is
entitled to summary judgment. Evidence in summary judgment
motions must be reflected in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If the non-moving party can establish more than a
scintilla of probative evidence that there is a genuine issue of material
fact, then a no evidence summary judgment is improper. To establish
more than a scintilla of evidence, the nonmovant's evidence must
enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach different
conclusions. A scintilla is not established when evidence only creates a
mere surmise or suspicion of a fact.
On appeal, the Raburns alleged there was a general rule in Texas
that the owner and occupier of land abutting a highway has a duty to
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exercise reasonable care to avoid endangering those using the highway
as a means of travel, and is liable for any injuries resulting from such
negligence. This duty was limited to cases where a landowner
negligently released upon the highway an "agency that becomes
dangerous by its very nature once upon the highway." The Raburns
alleged KJI and the Straders diverted water into the culvert by putting
crushed concrete on the property, and thus owed a duty to those
traveling on that highway.
The court found this allegation to be conclusory, and not
supported by more than a scintilla of probative evidence that raised a
genuine issue of material fact. Even if the Raburns could put forth
sufficient evidence, the court held their claim would fail on alternate
grounds. The Texas Water Code states that one who diverts the
natural flow of surface waters may be liable for any property damage
suffered as a result of the diversion. The code does not include
liability for survival actions, personal injuries, or wrongful death.
Additionally, the state of Texas' responsibility over water covering a
stretch of highway pertained only to flood water. The court found the
trial court accurately held the water discussed here was floodwater,
rather than surface water, as a matter of law. This finding was largely
due to the admissions of the Raburns themselves, as well as on the
clear and unambiguous definitions of surface and floodwaters found
in Texas case law.
Since the state of Texas had an exclusive, non-delegable duty
pertaining to flood control, the trial court was correct in holding KJI
and the Straders did not have a duty of reasonable care pertaining to
the highway adjacent to their land. The Raburns failed to produce
more than a scintilla of evidence pursuant to one of the elements of a
negligence claim, and, thus, the court affirmed the summary judgment
granted to KJI and the Straders.
Michael Sheehan

VERMONT
Town of Groton v. Agency of Natural Res., 772 A.2d 1103 (Vt. 2001)
(affirming the Water Resource Board's denial of the Town of Groton's
stream alteration permit application).
In July of 1996, the Town of Groton ("Town") filed an application
with the Agency of Natural Resources ("ANR") to alter the Wells River
so that the Town could repair a dam. The ANR requested more
information, as the Town's application was not complete. Before the
Town provided the requested information, ice and high water
destroyed the dam. Since the dam's destruction, the Wells River below
the dam is considered one of the few high quality habitats for sculpin,
trout, and salmon.

